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Incompatible experiences: Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews in Lviv under Soviet and 
German occupation, 1939-1944 
 
 
 
 „What men think is more important in history than the objective facts.‟ (A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 
1848-1918 (Oxford, New York 1991), 17) 
Perceptions of reality and not reality itself determine the behaviour of people. Such 
perceptions are at the same time subjective and socially determined. While most historians 
would agree with these statements, in historical practice such truisms are often disregarded. 
When the perceptions of historical actors diverge from the reconstructed reality, this is seen as 
an expression of false consciousness. To avoid such specious conclusions I have chosen an 
approach based on what in German is termed Erfahrungsgeschichte, that is, the history of 
experience. In German both Erlebnis and Erfahrung translate as experience, but they have a 
different meaning. Erlebnis is the event and the emotions experienced during the event, while 
Erfahrung is the result of a successful interpretation of events: the events are given meaning. 
Following Reinhart Koselleck, Erfahrung (experience) is defined as a process in which 
perception, interpretation and actions are being permanently adjusted to one another. 
Expectations regarding the future as well as the previous conditioning of people affect this 
process of adjusting experiences. Both expectations and conditioning function as filters 
through which events are perceived, and provide models, with the help of which reality is 
then interpreted. The same events can result in completely different Erfahrungen, depending 
on the factors mentioned. In this text I will use the term experience in this sense, i.e. as 
Erfahrung rather than Erlebnis.
1
  
What do such considerations have to do with my topic? The end of communism in Eastern 
Europe initiated a revision of the history of the Second World War. Two key questions in this 
context are the extent of local anti-Semitism and the anti-Jewish pogroms in Eastern Poland 
after the German attack on the Soviet Union. Popular interpretations in Poland and Western 
Ukraine attribute the outbursts of violent anti-Semitism to an assumed wide-scale 
collaboration of Jews with the Soviet power. The old stereotype of Judeo-Communism has 
remained very influential, even appearing in scholarly works.
2
 In Polish and Ukrainian 
collective memory, Poles and Ukrainians are seen as the main victims of German and Soviet 
occupation. The glorification of the heroic struggle of national resistance fighting against 
oppressors makes it difficult to engage with the question of Polish and Ukrainian participation 
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 This approach was used in the Sonderforschungsbereich (Special Research Area) 437 on „The Experience of 
War – War and Society in Modern History‟ at the University of Tübingen, funded by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft. Reinhart Koselleck, „“Erfahrungsraum“ und “Erwartungshorizont” – zwei historische 
Kategorien‟, in Reinhart Koselleck (ed.), Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt 
am Main 1989), 349-372. Nikolaus Buschmann and Horst Carl (eds.), Die Erfahrung des Krieges. 
Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Paderborn 
2001), 11-26. 
2
 See the very sharp criticism by Joanna Michlic, „The Soviet Occupation of Poland, 1939-41, and the stereotype 
of the anti-Polish and pro-Soviet Jew‟, Jewish Social Studies History, Culture, Society n.s. 13, no. 3 
(Spring/Summer 2007), 135-176.  
in Nazi crimes, especially in crimes directed against the Jewish population. In Poland a 
controversial debate on Polish anti-Semitism was initiated when Jan Gross published his book 
on the Eastern Polish village Jedwabne, where Polish inhabitants had murdered their Jewish 
neighbours on July 10, 1941. The Kączynski government subsequently announced the launch 
of a new history policy to preserve the traditional heroic image of the Polish nation.
3
 In 
independent Ukraine several governmental and parliamentary commissions have focused on 
the question of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsija Ukraïns‟kykh 
Natsionalistiv, OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukraïns‟ka Povstans‟ka Armiia) 
and how to site these mostly Western Ukrainian nationalist organisations within a new, 
unifying Ukrainian national narrative. In Eastern Ukraine many people share the dominant 
Polish and Jewish view of the OUN and UPA as war criminals who collaborated with the 
Nazis, while in Western Ukraine the same nationalists are glorified as heroic fighters against 
foreign oppression. One person‟s hero is another person‟s villain.4 Jewish, Polish and 
Ukrainian memories of the war contradict each other. Piotr Wróbel spoke of the „double 
memory‟ of Poles and Jews, and the Holocaust survivor and historian Philip Friedman wrote 
of the „wide gulf separating the Jewish and Ukrainian interpretations‟.5 Similar mechanisms 
occur in the debate on Ukrainian-Polish relations, with Ukrainians and Poles accusing each 
other of having started the ethnic cleansing of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands.
6
  
These multiple, often conflicting memories of the war can be traced back to contradictory 
experiences. I take these experiences seriously as an expression of how the groups perceived 
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 Jan Tomasz Gross, Sąsiedzi. Historia zagłady żydowskiego miasteczka (Sejny 2000); published in English as 
Neighbors. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton 2001). On the Jedwabne 
debate see Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic (eds.), The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the 
Jedwabne Massacre in Poland (Princeton 2004). See also William Brand (ed.), Thou shalt not kill: Poles on 
Jedwabne (Warsaw 2001). Articles and sources have been published by the Instytut Pamięci Narodowej: Wokół 
Jedwabnego. Pod redakcją Pawła Machiewicza i Krzystofa Persaka, 2 vols. (Warsaw 2002). 
4
 Wilfried Jilge, „Competing Victimhoods – Post-Soviet Ukrainian Narratives on World War II, in Elazar 
Barkan, Elisabeth A. Cole and Kai Struve (eds.), Shared History – Divided Memory. Jews and Others in Soviet 
Occupied Poland, 1939-1941 (Leipzig 2007), 103-131. On the „deafening silence‟ about, and the reluctance to 
confront war crimes of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Diaspora see John-Paul Himka, „War Criminality: A Blank 
Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora‟, Spaces of Identity 5.1 (2005), 9-24; Per Anders 
Rudling, „Historical Representations of the Wartime Accounts of the Activities of the OUN-UPA (Organization 
of Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army)‟, East European Jewish Affairs, vol. 36, no 2 (December 
2006, 163-189. See also the overview of history debates in Ukraine in David R. Marples, Heroes and Villains. 
Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (Budapest, New York 2007),  
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 Philip Friedman, „Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi occupation‟, YIVO. Annual of Jewish Social 
Science, vol. 12 (1959), 295 f; Piotr Wróbel, „Double Memory: Poles and Jews after the Holocaust‟, East 
European Politics and Societies, vol. 11, no. 3 (Fall 1997), 560-574; Grzegorz Motyka, „Między porozumieniem 
a zbrodnią. II. wojna światowa oraz jej skutki w stosunkach polsko-ukraińskich‟, in Robert Traba (ed.), Tematy 
polsko-ukraińskie (Olsztyn 2001), 93-102; Aharon Weiss, „Jewish-Ukrainian Relations during the Holocaust‟, in 
Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective (Edmonton 2
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 ed. 1990), 409-420; Taras Hunczak, 
„Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations‟, in Michael R. Marrus (ed.), Public 
Opinion and Relations to the Jews in Europe (Westport, London 1989), 396-414.  
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 Timothy Snyder, „The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing, 1943‟, Past and Present, no. 179 (May 
2003), 197-234; Timothy Snyder, „”To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All”. The Ethnic Cleansing 
of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943-1947‟, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (Spring 1999), 86-120; Wanda 
Gałązka, „Stan i perspektywy śledztw w sprawach dotyczących zbrodni nacjonalistów ukraińskich‟, in Polska i 
Ukraina po II. wojnie światowej (Rzeszów 1998), 345-352; Krystyna Kersten, „The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict 
under Communist Rule‟, Acta Poloniae Historica, vol. 73 (1996), 135-151. 
themselves and others. The essay focuses on the example of the multiethnic Eastern Polish, 
now Western Ukrainian city of Lviv. Located in an ethnographically mostly Ukrainian region, 
in the inter-war period the city was part of the Second Polish Republic with a Polish majority 
population. In 1939, 157,490 of the 312,231 inhabitants were Polish, 49,747 were Ukrainian 
and 99,595 Jewish.
7
  
Diaries, memoirs and other autobiographical documents are the most important sources for 
war experiences in this city.
8
 This article uses wartime documents created by eyewitnesses of 
events. The main source for Jewish views are the notes and diaries of refugees from Eastern 
Poland collected in the Warsaw ghetto by Emanuel Ringelblum and his co-workers. Many of 
them have been published in the third volume of the Ringelblum archive.
9
 I also use some 
published diaries and eyewitness accounts of Jewish survivors, which were collected or 
inspired by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw in the immediate post-war period. They 
give trustworthy accounts of events after July 1941 but are less useful for the period of Soviet 
occupation. In post-war Poland most authors did not dare to write about Soviet repressions or 
the prison murders of June 1941. For the Polish side I used diaries and documents from the 
Lviv Command of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa) and its predecessor organisation, the 
Union for Armed Struggle (Związek Walk Zbrojnej). The reports summarise the views of the 
local Polish population.
10
 For the Ukrainian side I have the fewest number of suitable wartime 
documents. Here my main sources are a few diaries and reports by the local group of the 
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (Bandera faction) OUN-B.
11
 In a few cases I have 
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 Grzegorz Hryciuk,‟Zmiany demograficzne ludnosci polskiej w latach 1931-1944‟, in Wschodnye losy Polaków. 
Pod red. S. Ciesielskiego (Wrocław 1997), 7-76. 
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 James E. Young, „Zwischen Geschichte und Erinnerung. Über die Wiedereinführung der Stimme der 
Erinnerung in die historische Erzählung‟, in Harald Welzer (ed.), Das soziale Gedächtnis. Geschichte, 
Erinnerung, Tradierung, (Hamburg 2001), 41-62. On the importance of memoirs see also Jan Tomasz Gross, 
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 Archiwum Ringelbluma (AR). Konspiracyjne Archiwum Getta Warszawy, vol. 3: Relacje z Kresów. Opr. 
Andrzej Żbikowski (Warszawa 2000). See also Andrzej Żbikowski, „Jewish Reaction to the Soviet Arrival in the 
Kresy in September 1939‟, Polin, vol. 13 (2000): Focusing on the Holocaust and its Aftermath, 62-72. On the 
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the Warsaw Ghetto (London 2007). 
10
 In November/December of 1939 emissaries from the Polish centres of resistance in Paris and London arrived 
in Lviv and appointed two different leaders for the Lwów Territory ZWZ. This resulted in two rival ZWZ 
organisations, later called ZWZ-1 and ZWZ-2. ZWZ-1 consisted mainly of members or sympathisers of the 
National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe) while ZWZ-2 was supported by followers from the Piłsudski camp. 
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Cole/Struve, op. cit., 147-171. 
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Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!” Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 
1928-1948 (Berlin 2007); John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (Littleton, CO, 2
nd
 ed. 1980). 
supplemented these sources by material taken from memoirs or from accounts which were 
written after the war. The sources cannot do justice to the multitude of different experiences 
of Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish societies, but they represent discourses which were prevalent 
during the war and were to deeply influence the post-war memory. 
I will be concentrating on key events which have a firm place in Jewish, Polish, and 
Ukrainian collective memory: the reciprocal perceptions during the Soviet occupation, the 
pogroms which occurred during the transition from the Soviet to the German occupation, and 
the violent settlement of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the second half of the war.  
 
1 Soviet Occupation 
The Soviet Army invaded Eastern Poland under the pretext of liberating Belarusians and 
Ukrainians from the „Polish yoke‟ and of bringing social liberation to the toiling masses. And 
indeed, the end of Polish domination pleased Osyp Nazaruk, the editor-in-chief of the Greek-
Catholic weekly newspaper Nova Zoria, but his joy was clouded by the uncertain future 
ahead.
12
 Soon the occupiers turned against the pre-war elite, including the leaders of the 
Ukrainian political parties. Nazaruk fled to the Germans.  
During the Soviet occupation, class theoretically mattered more than ethnicity, but in 
everyday life class and ethnicity were interlinked, and ethnic categories played an important 
role. The Soviet authorities attempted to win the allegiance of the lower classes, the younger 
generation and parts of the intelligentsia. In government-controlled elections, the population 
elected a Western Ukrainian national assembly which voted for union with the Ukrainian 
Socialist Soviet Republic. The Ukrainians were the titular nationality, which meant that they 
took precedence in the administration, in culture and education, over Poles and Jews.
13
 
The city was sovietised, flooded with Soviet symbols and inundated with propaganda directed 
against the Second Polish Republic. Newcomers from Eastern Ukraine and other parts of the 
Soviet Union occupied key positions in the administration and economy, but local Ukrainians 
were also given positions which had previously been the sole province of Poles.
14
 The 
Ukrainian scholar Myroslav Semchyshyn writes in his recollections how beautiful it was to 
hear Ukrainian words and songs on the street and to read Ukrainian inscriptions.
15
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 Osyp Nazaruk, Zi L‟vova do Varshava 2-13 zhovtnia 1939 roku (Lviv 1995), 14 ff. See also Grzegorz 
Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie 1939-1944. Życie codzienne (Warszawa 2000), 30. 
13
 Adam Sudoł, Początki Sowietyzacji Kresów Wschodnich (Jesień 1939 roku) (Bydgoszcz, Toruń 1997); Jan 
Gross, Revolution from Abroad. The Soviet Conquest of Poland‟s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia 
(Princeton 1987); Jan Gross, „The Jewish Community in the Soviet-Annexed Territories on the Eve of the 
Holocaust‟, in Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock (eds.), The Holocaust in the Soviet Union. Studies and 
Sources on the Destruction of Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941-1945 (Armonk, NY 
1993), 155-171. 
14
 Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, op. cit., 41 ff. 
15
 Myroslav Semchyshyn, Z knyhy Leva. Ukraïns‟kyi L‟viv dvadstiatykh-sorokovykh rokiv (Lviv 1998), 65 ff, 70, 
81 ff. See also Ostap Tarnavs‟kyi, Literaturnyi L‟viv 1939-1944 (Lviv 1995), 19. 
The Soviet policy changed once it became apparent that its aggressive strategy to win the 
sympathies of Western Ukrainians was doomed to disappointment. Once the occupied 
territories had been incorporated into the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, many local 
Ukrainians supported the anti-Soviet OUN. After the summer of 1940 the Soviet Union 
turned more towards the Poles, who were courted in their turn and granted concessions in the 
area of cultural policies.
16
 
Terror and repression were an integral part of sovietisation. Victims were defined either 
exclusively by their class status (as members of the pre-war social and political elite), by the 
combination of ethnicity and social status (e.g., Polish military settlers), by their status as 
aliens (e.g., the mostly Jewish refugees from German occupied Poland), or by their political 
convictions (Jewish socialists – Bundists, Zionists or Ukrainian nationalists). Poles, 
Ukrainians and Jews were affected differently and at different points in time by the waves of 
repression. Initially a large part of the social pre-war elite was arrested or deported. Many of 
them, like the Polish officers who were taken by the Red Army as prisoners of war, were later 
shot. The Polish population was therefore most deeply affected by this first wave of arrests 
and deportations, followed by the Jewish population. In the night of the 12th to the 13th April 
1940, some 7,000–8,500 Poles, mostly family members of officers and policemen were 
deported from the city of Lviv. The second wave primarily hit the economic elite; Jews and 
Poles in particular, but also the few existing Ukrainian entrepreneurs, were imprisoned or 
deported. The last wave of arrests and deportations was specifically directed against 
Ukrainian nationalists. When the Germans invaded, many Ukrainians were still in the jails of 
the People‟s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, 
NKVD). Additional groups of victims included Polish peasants who had settled in the Eastern 
areas as part of the population policy of the pre-war Polish government, well-to-do Ukrainian 
and Polish peasants, and about 70,000 refugees, the majority of them Jews, who had fled from 
German occupied territories in the autumn of 1939 to the Soviet sphere of influence. No 
group escaped Soviet repression, but Poles and Jews were proportionally more affected by the 
terror than the Ukrainian population.
17
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 Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, op. cit., 44-49; Grzegorz Hryciuk, „“Nowy Kurs”? Ewolucja Polityki Radzieckiej 
wobec Polaków we Lwowie (Czerwiec 1940 – Czerwiec 1941)‟, Wrocławskie Studia z Historii Najnowszej, vol. 
6 (1998), 47-66. 
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 Based on published NKVD data, it appears that more than 100,000 people were arrested in the Soviet 
occupied Polish territory, and between 300,000 and half a million people were deported between 1939 and 1941. 
Almost 60% of the deportees were ethnic Poles, more than 20% were Jews, 10% were Ukrainians and more than 
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Polacy we Lwowie, op. cit., 35-41; Hryciuk, „Victims 1939-1941: The Soviet Repressions in Eastern Poland‟, in 
Barkan/Cole/Struve, op. cit., 173-200; Jakov Khonigsman, Katastrofa Evreistva Zapadnoi Ukraïny. Evrei 
Vostochnoi Galicii, Zapadnoi Volyni, Bukoviny i Zakarpat‟ia 1933-1945 godakh (Lviv 1998), 104 f. See also 
Christoph Mick, „“Only the Jews do not waver…” L‟viv under Soviet Occupation, in Barkan/Cole/Struve, op. 
cit., 245-262; Jan Gross, „The Jewish Community in the Soviet-Annexed Territories on the Eve of the Holocaust: 
A Social Scientist‟s View, in Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock (eds.), The Holocaust in the Soviet 
Union. Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941-
1945 (Armonk, N.Y., 1993), 155-170. 
It is not surprising that the Polish population was broken-hearted. An eyewitness wrote in his 
diary of „complete chaos‟ and „immeasurable tragedy‟.18 The Polish resistance organisations 
in Lviv reported that Poles and Ukrainians did not differ much in their reception of the new 
Soviet power. The working class was initially quite enthusiastic, while the middle class was 
hostile to the Soviet occupiers. Some reports noted that the majority of the Jewish population 
had received the Soviets with open pleasure, even enthusiastically, and that some Jews had 
turned against Polish soldiers, disarmed and bound them.
19
  
Jewish authors paint a more differentiated portrait of the behaviour of the Jewish population. 
While the persecution of Zionists, Bundists and the destruction of the Jewish middle class are 
mentioned, all reports agree that a large part of the Jewish youth greeted the Soviets 
enthusiastically and later participated in Soviet events.
20
 One Jewish eyewitness even 
confirmed that after the entry of the Red Army Jews declared their aversion to Poles:  
„For us Jews it was politically very unwise that a part of Jewish 
society behaved very badly to the Polish population and to Polish 
soldiers.‟ 21 
Some Jewish Polish authors severely censured the friendly behaviour of fellow Jews towards 
the Soviet power. One refugee from Warsaw believed the tense relationships of other 
nationalities with the Jews were due „exclusively to the Jews seeking top positions‟ and 
another refugee reported that Jewish teachers went to the country to propagate 
collectivisation; thus, for the peasants, the impression was given that everything was the fault 
of the Jews.
22
 Jewish authors account for the friendly reception of the Red Army by pointing 
to the unpopular German alternative and recalling the experiences of anti-Semitism and 
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 Cited in Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, op. cit., 17. 
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 Report (excerpt), not dated (probably from November or December 1941), Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), 
Armia Krajowa – Komenda Obszara Lwowa (AK-KOL), 203 (MF 2400/7), 59 f; Report on Jews, Summer 1942, 
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for General Sosnkowski, 9 January 1940, in Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939-1945, vol. 1: Sept. 1939 – 
April 1941 (London 1960), 64. See also Memorandum on the Ukrainian Problem, December 1943, in Mikołaj 
Siwicki, Dzieje konfliktów polsko-ukraińskich, vol. 2 (Warsaw 1992), 75. 
20
 Report by an anonymous refugee from Lviv, not dated, in AR, vol. 3, no. 30, 517 f, 525 f; Report by an 
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(Polish translation from Yiddish), March 1942, in AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 776; Report on Jewish schools during 
Soviet occupation, probably by Stanisław Różycki, not dated, in AR, vol. 3, no. 42, 808-816; Protocol of an 
interview with the refugee St. Au. on the situation of Jews under Soviet occupation and the beginning of German 
occupation (Polish translation from Yiddish), Warsaw 1942, in AR, vol. 3, no. 43, 893 f. See also Żbikowski, 
„Jewish Reaction‟, op. cit., 62-72; Jan Tomasz Gross, „“Ja za takie wyzwolenie dziękuję i proszę ich żeby to był 
ostatni raz”‟, in Jan Gross, Upiorna dekada: trzy eseje o stereotypach na temat Żydów, Polaków, Niemców i 
komunistów 1939-1948 (Cracow 1988), 61-92; Ben-Zion Pinchuc, Shtetl Jews under Soviet Rule: Eastern 
Poland on the Eve of the Holocaust, (Oxford 1990); Don Levin, „The Response of the Jews of Eastern Poland to 
the Invasion of the Red Army in September 1939 (As Described by Jewish Witnesses)‟, Gal-Ed: On the History 
of the Jews in Poland, vol. 11 (1989), 87-102. For the northern part of East Poland see Marek Wierzbicki, 
Polacy i Żydzi w zaborze sowieckim. Stosunki polsko-żydowskie na ziemiach północno-wschodnich II RP pod 
okupacją sowiecką (1939-1941) (Warsaw 2001). 
21
 AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 772. 
22
 Report by an anonymous refugee from Warsaw on the situation under Soviet occupation in Lviv and Łuck, 
written in Warsaw after 7 December 1941, in AR, vol. 3, no. 36, 695; AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 774 f. 
discrimination suffered by Jews in the Second Polish Republic. The equal treatment 
vouchsafed to Jews and the fight against anti-Semitism are repeatedly given as the most 
important reasons justifying Jewish pro-Soviet sympathies.
23
 
The Polish resistance monitored the behaviour of the Jewish population. High ranking 
members of Polish resistance organisations located in Warsaw were usually more 
understanding than the local resistance organisations in Lviv. General Michał Tokarzewski-
Karaszkiewicz, for example, reported in January 1940 that the Jewish population had 
welcomed the Soviet occupation not out of pro-communist sympathies but in the hope of 
improving their situation. Tokarszwski also noted a growing anti-Semitism in the general 
Polish and Ukrainian population. The Polish population especially hated the Soviet militia 
with its overwhelmingly Jewish and Ukrainian members. Two months later, Colonel Stefan 
„Grot‟ Rowecki, commander of the ZWZ in the German zone of occupation reported that the 
occupiers threatened the propertied Jewish classes, but he also confirmed that the hatred 
directed against the Bolsheviks had unleashed a hatred of Jews.
24
 
Members of the Polish underground in Lviv shared this hatred, even as late as 1942. Although 
they were aware that many wealthy Jews, Zionists, members of the Bund and other socialist 
parties had been arrested and deported, they quickly passed over such incidents, as they 
considered the Zionists as having „no influence over the masses‟. The reports took the 
behaviour of some Jewish youths as the basis for more general accusations. Jewish 
communists in particular were accused of having used meetings to incite the „hatred of the 
Jewish masses‟ against the Polish population under the pretext of fighting the Polish 
bourgeoisie. The „Jewish masses‟ was shorthand for the general threat posed by Jews. Jews 
were accused of collaborating with the Soviets, of denouncing Poles, profiting from their 
misery and taking over their positions. This was interpreted as the outbreak of a secret and 
long-standing Jewish hatred of Poles. Only Jewish Polish patriots were excluded from this 
collective accusation. The reports leave no room for doubt that Poles believed that the Jews 
were following a policy which was hostile to Poland. In a memorandum from the summer of 
1942, the Jewish population was still considered to form a „natural sphere of influence for 
Soviet Russia‟ and as the principal supporters of Bolshevik rule in eastern Poland. Some 
counter-examples were noted; however these had no impact on the general opinion: 
„Among the Jews there are cases of active aid given to persecuted 
Poles, their liberation from the hands of furious and shouting Jewish 
mobs, but this behaviour on the part of certain Jewish groups can 
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 AR, vol. 3, no. 36, 694; AR, vol. 3, no. 30, 517 f; AR, vol. 3, no. 42, 816; Stanisław Różycki on his experiences 
in Lviv, 1 June 1941 – 29 September 1941, not dated, in AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 538, 543 f. 
24
 Report on the political and economic situation sent by General Michał Tokarszewski-Karaszkiewicz to 
General Sosnkowski, 9 January 1940, in Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, vol. 1, op. cit., 64-69; Intelligence 
report sent by Colonel Rowecki to General Sosnkowski, 8 February 1940, in ibid., 107. 
never take away the blame for the behaviour of Jews during the 
Bolshevik invasion.‟ 25 
Ukrainian reports also linked the Jews with Soviet rule. The Ukrainian press appearing in the 
Generalgouvernement took up the old propaganda slogan of „Judeo-Communism‟ and 
accused the Jews of profiting from the Soviet occupation and of denouncing Ukrainian 
resistance fighters to the Soviet security forces. This was consistent with the anti-Semitic 
attitude of the OUN.
26
 Jews were seen as a „second rate enemy‟ linked to Bolshevism and 
collectively held responsible for Soviet measures.
27
 The Second General Congress of the 
OUN-B in April 1941 stated in its resolution: 
„The Jews in the U.S.S.R. constitute the most faithful support of the ruling 
Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in the Ukraine. The 
Muscovite-Bolshevik government exploits the anti-Jewish sentiments of the 
Ukrainian masses to divert their attention from the true cause of their misfortune 
and to channel them in times of frustration into pogroms on Jews. The OUN 
combats the Jews as the prop of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime and 
simultaneously it renders them conscious of the fact that the principal foe is 
Moscow.‟28 
However, other voices also persisted. Milena Rudnytska, the chairwoman of the women‟s 
organisation Soiuz Ukraïnok, did not agree with the general accusation of collaboration 
levelled against the Jews.  
„In the authorities they [the Bolsheviks, C.M.] have employed Jews, 
but with the exception of them they often have nobody else on whom 
they can depend.‟ 
Rudnytska believed that the „Jews in general are as dissatisfied as we are‟. The Jewish middle 
class had been destroyed as had their trade. However, Rudnytska does find something positive 
in the latter: 
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„This is more important for us from a national standpoint than the 
dissolution of large landed properties.‟29 
This is a reference to a Polish and Ukrainian nationalist discourse which went back to the end 
of the 19
th
 century. In this discourse, the strong position of Jews in the free professions and in 
the middle class was perceived as hindering the rise of a Polish or Ukrainian middle class and 
preventing the modernisation of both societies.
30
 
The Polish underground organisation accused not only Jews but also Ukrainians of disloyalty 
to the Polish state, of collaborating with the Soviets and driving out Poles from the 
administration, from industry, trade, the universities and the education system.
31
 However, 
this behaviour by Ukrainians was not interpreted as an expression of communist or pro-Soviet 
feelings and differs fundamentally from the Polish interpretation of Jewish behaviour. One 
report explicitly stated that the Ukrainian elite remained thoroughly nationalist and kept its 
distance to the regime despite being granted privileges.
32
 Jewish authors also accused the 
Ukrainians of opportunism, but they also realised that it was an opportunism which took 
advantage of the additional freedoms obtained to pursue its own nationalist interests. 
Ukrainian nationalism – one author noticed – survived under the cloak of collaboration (pod 
płaszczykiem współpracy).33  
Almost all inhabitants shared the hatred of the NKVD, of the political commissars and the 
party bigwigs.
34
 The Galicians – according to one Jewish author – were united by their 
distrust of the new colleagues from the Soviet Union.
35
 This is confirmed by the Ukrainian 
scholar Semchyshyn: „In short – it was US and the newcomers were THEM‟.36 But for the 
Jewish population, Soviet rule was – as the Jewish Pole Stanisław Różycki37 underlines – the 
only hope. 
„Only the Jews do not waver, regardless of their feelings or their rational and 
moderate attitude towards the Union, although they suffered, although their 
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possessions were seized, their families were deported, nevertheless they counted 
solely on Russia, because everything is better than the Germans.‟38  
The Polish and the Ukrainian population were – according to reports from the Polish 
underground – not just united by their common hostility against the regime but also by a 
shared hatred of Jews, who were perceived as having profited from Soviet rule. Indeed, Jews 
were collectively linked with Soviet communism. A Polish eyewitness called it a „sad 
paradox‟ that the hatred of Jews represented practically „the only bridge of communication 
between Poles and Ukrainians‟. This hatred – he continued – extended even beyond the hatred 
of the Bolsheviks and the pressure was only waiting for the right moment to be released.
39
  
 
2. German occupation and the murder of the Jews 
The Jews did not yet know the terrible fate awaiting them, but the German attack horrified 
them. The refugees prepared for another flight, and the local Jewish communists left. Jewish 
eyewitnesses observed that the mood of the Polish population appeared to be contradictory. 
On the one hand there was a certain Schadenfreude vis-à-vis Jews, Bolsheviks and Russians, 
on the other hand the Poles secretly feared the Ukrainians and Germans. Already prior to the 
entry of the Wehrmacht, Ukrainian nationalists had attempted an uprising and taken 
advantage of the confusion to attack Soviet officials but also to carry out the first attacks 
against Jews. The uprising failed but immediately after the withdrawal of the Red Army the 
Ukrainians controlled – according to Różycki – every house, and handed Jews and Poles over 
to the newly founded Ukrainian militia.
 
Long queues formed in front of grocery shops. Jews 
standing in the queues were insulted by Poles and Ukrainians and pushed out of the queue. 
Some Ukrainians and Poles stopped greeting Jews. However, not everybody behaved like 
this. Różycki noticed that many workers and intellectuals had not changed their behaviour. He 
came to the conclusion that the Ukrainians actually only hated Poles. But acting from base 
motives they were also prepared to carry out anti-Jewish pogroms. Everyday he expected a 
pogrom to break out, a fear – he believed – which was also shared by Poles.40 Another 
witness, writing in Yiddish, feared not only the Ukrainians, but also the Poles, considering 
both groups „capable of sinking their teeth into the Jews‟.41  
The first German troops reached the outskirts of Lviv on June 30, 1941. The Jewish 
population, which had increased in the last two years to more than 150,000, remained 
fearfully inside their homes. Opinions differed regarding the behaviour of the Polish 
population. Some reported that the Poles – with individual exceptions – remained indifferent. 
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One Jewish author reported that the Poles greeted the German soldiers joyfully and that the 
whole Polish population hurried to them with flowers in their hands.
42
 No other eyewitness 
reports such a reception, but the Lviv Command of the Home Army confirms that after the 
experiences under Soviet occupation the Germans were received in a friendly manner, 
sometimes even with sympathy.
43
  
All Jewish authors were agreed that the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian population 
greeted the German units enthusiastically or, in the words of an eyewitness, „The Ukrainians 
welcomed the Germans with flowers, laughter, joy, full of hope and illusions, as rescuers and 
liberators‟.44 The gold and blue Ukrainian flag flew next to the swastika. Posters of the 
Bandera faction of the OUN calling for a „Ukraine for the Ukrainians‟ were everywhere.45 
The Nachtigall battalion – a Ukrainian unit of the German military counterintelligence service 
Abwehr – and several Ukrainian so-called expeditionary groups (pokhidni hrupy) entered the 
city together with the German troops. The Ukrainian expeditionary groups worked for the 
German Army as translators and functioned as intermediaries to the local population, but they 
had a hidden agenda. Stepan Bandera, the leader of the OUN-B, had ordered them to establish 
a Ukrainian administration and lay the foundations for a Ukrainian state. The intention was to 
confront the German authorities with a fait accompli. Bandera‟s emissary Yaroslav Stets‟ko 
ignored German orders and met local Ukrainian leaders in the Prosvita building to form a 
Ukrainian government and proclaim a Ukrainian state. Shortly afterwards, two German 
Abwehr officers (Hans Koch and Ernst zur Eickern) who had learned of Stets‟ko‟s intention 
when they had arrived at the residence of the Greek-Catholic archbishop succeeded in 
entering the building through a side entrance. The main entrance was blocked by a large 
crowd. The assembly greeted them with „unmeasured enthusiasm‟. Hans Koch addressed the 
meeting but carefully avoided offering any recognition of the proclamation. Later the local 
Ukrainians were informed that the proclamation had not been approved by the German 
government. In the next few days Stet‟sko tried to obtain German approval of the 
proclamation, but failed. In the German plans for the “Lebensraum im Osten” there was no 
space for an independent or even semi-independent Ukrainian state.
46
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At the same time as Stets‟ko was proclaiming a Ukrainian state, members of the Ukrainian 
expeditionary groups (pokhidni hrupy) and local people went to the prisons to look for friends 
and relatives. Before the Red Army had left the city, the NKVD had murdered at least 3000 
prisoners. The mass graves were discovered a short time later.
47
 The real culprits – the Soviet 
prison guards – had already left the city, but many Ukrainians and Poles believed that the 
NKVD was dominated by Jews. Jewish eyewitnesses understandably rejected the suggestion 
of any collective responsibility of the local Jewish population for the NKVD murders in the 
Lviv prisons or for other Soviet crimes.
48
 But the emissaries of the OUN had formed a local 
militia which turned against the Jewish population. Ukrainian militiamen and civilians chased 
down Jews, took them to the prisons, forced them to exhume the bodies, mistreated and 
finally killed them.
49
 
Różycki was shocked that local Ukrainians were accompanying German officers through the 
streets and helping them to hunt out „hostile elements‟, i.e. Jews.50 Rumours of terribly 
tortured and crucified prisoners circulated in the city. Ukrainian patrols rounded up Jews in 
the street and beat men and women, young and old. From the window of his house, on 1 July 
1941 the retired law professor Maurycy Allerhand saw Ukrainians beating Jews, using sticks 
and whips. He recognised them as Ukrainians not just by their blue and gold armbands, but 
also by the Ukrainian insults they used against the Jews. In front of the prisons an enormous 
crowd had assembled and Jews were made to run the gauntlet of the crowd.
 Allerhand‟s 
grown-up son Jonatan was captured by Ukrainians. A German soldier took him to the 
Brygidka prison. While his wife and son were able to escape with the help of a German 
officer, in the Brygidka Jonatan Allerhand was forced to help remove and clean the corpses. 
The German soldiers wore gas masks and watched the scene. Ukrainian militiamen beat Jews 
and constantly threatened them with shooting. Jonatan Allerhand was one of the very few 
who survived. After his return twelve wounds were counted on his body. It is not known how 
many Jews were murdered in this pogrom. Estimates range from 4000 to 8000 victims..
51
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The German military authorities tolerated this anti-Semitic violence. A secret order by 
Reinhard Heydrich, the SS Chief of Security Service and Security Police and head of the 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office), had recommended inciting the local 
population to anti-Jewish violence, but there is no evidence that German agitators were 
responsible for the Lviv pogrom. The first Nazi killing squad, the Sonderkommando 4b, 
arrived after the pogrom had already started.
52
  
Some observers reported that the Ukrainian Nachtigall battalion had marched through the 
streets chanting „death to the Moscow-Jewish commune‟. For Różycki, the Ukrainians 
collectively were responsible for the pogrom.
53
 Other authors did not blame the entire 
Ukrainian population. They accused „janitors, Ukrainian youths, hysterical women and simple 
people from the underworld‟, absolving the Polish population and the Ukrainian intelligentsia 
of any responsibility for such acts:  
„The pogrom and repressive activities were carried out only by lower classes, the 
scum of the Ukrainians‟.54  
This was also the standpoint – according to Maurycy Allerhand – of the Ukrainian elite, even 
if they did not directly accuse antisocial Polish elements of being the offenders. Allerhand 
believed that the German front-line soldiers had not behaved badly on the first day, but that 
the military had given the Ukrainian population a free hand to carry out this „legal pogrom‟.55 
Another eyewitness believed that „sinister Ukrainians, Petliura supporters and old pogromists‟ 
had begun the pogrom on their own initiative. But Allerhand and other eyewitnesses also 
reported the active participation of German soldiers who, in some streets, helped Ukrainians 
to round up Jews. German soldiers and officers watched the atrocities; some took photographs 
and even a film crew was present. The actual killing was done by the Ukrainian militia, and 
members of the local population participated in beating up the victims. Often the Jews had to 
run a gauntlet before they could enter the prison yard.
56 
According to a report of the Polish 
underground the pogrom had been ordered by the Germans and „had been carried out by 
Ukrainian and Polish scum‟57. However, no other Polish sources mention any participation of 
Poles in the pogrom. 
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In the first days of the occupation the Germans began flooding Western Ukraine with anti-
Semitic pamphlets, posters, caricatures and proclamations. Their arguments were taken up 
and disseminated further by radio and in the legal Ukrainian press.
58
 Apart from propaganda 
articles in the press it is difficult to find any contemporary Ukrainian documents which refer 
to the pogrom against Jews or discuss Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the war. Therefore I 
must rely here mostly on memoirs. Semchyshyn held „urban scum‟ to be responsible for the 
bloody pogrom, believing that many wore badges in the Ukrainian colours yellow and blue 
without being Ukrainian.
59
 How difficult it was for the urban Ukrainian elite to accept the fact 
that the pogrom was carried out by Ukrainians is shown by reports of conversations between 
Jewish eyewitnesses and their Ukrainian acquaintances.
60
 The Greek-Catholic archbishop 
Andrii Sheptyts‟kyi evaded the question of the participation of Ukrainians in his letter to Pope 
Pius XII, written in August 1942. He merely noted that at the beginning of the war the 
German occupying forces had tried to prove that local citizens or policemen were the 
offenders, but then the Germans began to kill their victims on the streets in front of all eyes 
without any shame.
61
 In Lviv the NKVD prison murders seemed to be an important 
motivation for the pogrom, but pogroms also occurred in villages and towns where no prison 
murders had taken place. We therefore have to look for additional reasons. The Ukrainian 
pokhidny hrupy seemed to have played an important role in inciting the local population, but 
it is not clear whether they were executing German orders or whether they had been instructed 
by leaders of the OUN. As in most pogroms, an important motivation was greed. The Jews 
were not only beaten, but also robbed and blackmailed. 
Shortly after the German invasion the Ukrainian militia was dissolved and the occupying 
power created a Ukrainian auxiliary police. This police force participated in the day-to-day 
chicaneries and cruelties against Jews as well as in many murders. It searched houses and 
harassed Polish passers-by. It is therefore not surprising that, next to the Germans, the 
Ukrainian auxiliary police became the chief object of hatred for Poles and Jews alike. One 
Jewish author believed that the Ukrainian police were recruited from the lowest classes of 
society. Their members had low moral standards, no sense of responsibility and bestial 
instincts, inclining them to robbery and acts of terror.
62
 Another author believed, on the 
contrary, that the Ukrainian police was recruited in part from among the academic Ukrainian 
youth which only shortly before had held – together with young Jewish men – positions in the 
Soviet youth organisation Komsomol. Now they were showing their true bloody, nationalist 
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and anti-Semitic face. On July 25 and 26
 
the German authorities allowed three days during 
which it was permissible to torture, kill and rob Jews without fear of reprisal. The auxiliary 
policemen were joined by Ukrainian peasants and by individual Poles greedy to rob and 
murder. These so-called Petliura days – the name given to them by the occupiers – were not 
spontaneous, the auxiliary police specifically targeted members of the Jewish intelligentsia. 
Policemen went from house to house, driving men, women and children like cattle to the 
Gestapo prisons. In the prisons the Jews were tortured and often subsequently murdered.
63
  
Jewish eyewitnesses noted that the relationship between Germans and Ukrainians had already 
begun to cool after the Germans annulled the proclamation of a Ukrainian state, took over the 
city, and began to give it a German appearance. The Ukrainian flag disappeared from the 
streets, leaving only the swastika. However, Ukrainians were again given positions of 
authority in the city administration. One Jewish witness remarked that Poles were very busy 
trading, smuggling and speculating.  
„And once again dreams come true: Poles are busy in “trade”, the Ukrainians are 
in the administration and the Jews do the physical work.‟  
All the documents tell of endless hours of work, cruelty, murder, hunger, epidemics and 
innumerable casualties among the Jewish population. Right from the start, the Jews were 
given much less food than the Poles and Ukrainians; by the middle of July 1941 Jews had to 
wear special armbands and were only permitted to use the last car in trams, later on they were 
not allowed to use trams at all. Some Poles and Ukrainians took advantage of the emergency, 
buying valuable goods for little money and selling food for a lot of money to the Jews. 
Blackmail was common. When the Jews had to move to the ghetto, on their way there they 
were robbed and beaten by Germans, Poles and Ukrainians. The perpetrators went to Jewish 
houses and took anything they wanted.
64
 Jewish eyewitnesses confirm that without the help of 
locals the Germans would not have been able to find so many of the Jews in hiding.
65
 
Maurycy Allerhand believed that only in exceptional cases did Poles participate in the 
plundering of Jewish homes. He placed all the blame on the Ukrainians who were trying to 
get rich by any means possible. Thus, for example, they would go from house to house asking 
the caretakers whether any Jews lived there. Then they would enter the houses and claim the 
flats for themselves, allowing themselves to be paid off with high sums of money. Poles – 
according to Allerhand – never participated in such activities.66 But some Ukrainians also 
helped Jews: 
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„In an atmosphere of brutal racist hatred, there were some cases, if not many, of 
humane behaviour on the part of Poles and Ukrainians.‟67  
Jewish eyewitnesses were also critical of the Jewish ghetto police, the Jewish 
Ordnungsdienst, which helped the German authorities to control the ghetto before its 
members themselves became victims of the Holocaust. This police force was a great 
misfortune for the Jewish population, because it included many corrupt elements.
68
  Leon 
Weliczker Wells echoed this view in his memoirs: „Those who had any self-respect did not 
join this group, and it was composed essentially of those from the Jewish rabble.‟69 
In these inter-ethnic relationships Jews appear exclusively as the victims of violence and 
attacks. Jewish society itself underwent an internal restructuring, which thereafter only 
partially reflected the old pre-war structures of Jewish society. From June to September 1941, 
many Lviv Jews were killed in pogroms and by German Einsatzgruppen. From October 1941 
to June 1942 as the „Endlösung‟ was prepared‟, members of the Jewish intelligentsia and 
„unproductive‟ people were murdered, the Lviv ghetto was established, mass murders 
intensified and many Jews were deported to the Bełżec death camp. From July 1942 to June 
1943 the ghetto was scaled down and finally liquidated.
70
 Almost all Lviv Jews were killed – 
only about 800 survived the war, either with the help of Poles and Ukrainians or by 
successfully hiding their identity.
71 
 
After the establishment of the Lviv ghetto the Jewish eyewitness accounts of the war break 
off or change in character. Now reports focus predominantly on hunger, misery, murders and 
fear. Reflections on Jewish relations to other ethnic groups become rare. With the destruction 
of the Lviv ghetto they stop altogether. On his flight by train to Warsaw one author of a report 
who was travelling with fake papers met Aryan smugglers. Despite the whole-scale murders 
of Jews they were still full of hatred against Jews: „The only area where we profit from the 
Germans is when they deal with the Jews.‟72 
Numerous actions against Jews who had fled to the forests show that even after the murder of 
hundreds of thousands of Jews Ukrainian partisan groups were still strongly anti-Semitic.
73
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Nevertheless, it should not be assumed from this that the entire Ukrainian population 
supported such exterminatory anti-Semitism. At least 100 death sentences were passed against 
Ukrainians who had aided Jews. Hundreds of Jewish adults and children were hidden in the 
residence of Archbishop Sheptyts‟kyj and in Uniate monasteries.74 
Despite the murder of tens of thousands of Jews from Lviv a memorandum by the local 
Command of the Home Army still considered the Jews to be a danger to the Poles. In this 
memorandum stereotypes from the arsenal of Polish pre-war anti-Semitisc accusations are 
combined with Nazi anti-Semitic tropes. Jews were seen as the most important internal enemy 
whose final plan it was to replace the Poles as the ruling class. The argument was that the 
Jews had not been defeated, only weakened, as only the weakest parts of the Jewish society 
had been murdered. Indirectly this had even somehow strengthened the Jews, because those 
who had survived were „not weighed down in the struggle for existence by this ballast‟.  
„One can say without reservation that the problem of the Jewish 
minority has the aspect of a difficult chronic disease among us which 
complicates the normal functioning of the social organism‟.  
Traditional national-democratic anti-Semitic arguments are used here, even though the 
context had changed fundamentally. The Jewish minority prevented – the report continued – 
the development of an independent third estate and thereby prevented the modernisation of 
society. The rise of talented Poles from the lower classes was being hampered by Jews. In this 
way Jews not only weakened the Poles but also stood in the way of a democratisation of 
society.
75
  
Yet this does not mean that the Polish population supported the murder of the Jewish 
population which took place directly before their eyes. The Lviv Command of the Home 
Army called the German plan to destroy the Jews in Lviv „ultrabestial‟ (ultrabestialski) and 
gave a detailed description of the so-called „August action‟ in 1942, in the course of which the 
German police and Ukrainian auxiliary police murdered at least 40,000 Jews or had them 
deported to the extermination camp Bełżec. The scenes witnessed moved even people who 
were hostile to Jews: 
„The Aryan population witnessed this action with pain, even if in the 
relationships to Jews a strong aversion had developed after the 
Bolshevik invasion, nevertheless, when their own eyes saw what was 
done to Jews, it made a pitiable impression on them.‟76 
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The reaction of the masses to the murder of Jews was relatively uniform:  
„All condemn the bestiality and the premeditation with which the Jews 
are being murdered, but generally it is said that the Jews are getting 
the punishment of history‟. 
Deep sympathy was often felt for individual Jews, to whom help was at times given even at 
the risk of the helper‟s own life. But in the „relation to the Jews generally there is a 
subconscious satisfaction that there will be no more Jews in the Polish organism‟.77 
 
3. The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict 
While the Nazi regime had decided by the end of 1941 to kill all Jews, a more differentiated 
policy was employed vis-à-vis Poles and Ukrainians, which depended on the general military 
situation and the willingness of the respective groups to cooperate with the Germans. The 
German occupiers gave Ukrainians preferential treatment, and relied heavily on Ukrainian 
collaboration. This does not mean that Ukrainian national ambitions would have had a future 
under German rule. According to the Generalplan Ost, Lviv and East Galicia were earmarked 
as future German settlement areas. The Ukrainian dreams of an autonomous state were finally 
crushed when East Galicia was included in the Generalgouvernement as „District Galicia‟ and 
not in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The German secret police, the Gestapo, arrested 
Bandera, Stets‟ko and other leaders of the OUN-B and brought them to the Sachsenhausen 
concentration camp. Such acts disillusioned the Ukrainian population and drove the OUN-B 
underground. For the Ukrainian nationalists the main enemy was the Soviet Union and 
resistance against the German occupiers was mostly limited to actions of self-defence and 
preventing the deportation of Ukrainian Ostarbeiter to the Third Reich.
78
  
The antagonism between Ukrainians and Poles increased under the German occupation. Their 
mutual hatred – as reported by the Lviv Command of the Home Army – permeated all social 
classes.
79
 The Polish „general opinion‟ held the Ukrainians to be responsible not only for the 
deportation of Polish settlers and of thousands of members of the Polish intelligentsia during 
the Soviet occupation but also accused them – falsely – of complicity in the murder of 25 
professors during the first days of the German occupation.
80
 One report listed numerous cases 
in which the Ukrainian auxiliary police had shot Poles. The Command also believed 
Ukrainians to be behind numerous robberies and murders. Moreover Ukrainians were 
believed to be the main informers of the Gestapo and the „eyes and ears‟ of the occupying 
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forces.
81
 The Poles – wrote another underground report – now had more reservations towards 
the Ukrainian police than about the German police.
82
 
The Ukrainian auxiliary police was hated by Jews and Poles alike. In contrast, both the OUN 
and other Ukrainians had a different perception of the Ukrainian police. The OUN noted that 
the police was greatly respected by the Poles. In a report dated March 1944 the Ukrainian 
police are referred to as „ours‟ (nashi politsianty).83 The fact that Ukrainians did not see the 
auxiliary police as hostile can be deduced from a diary entry of Arkadii Liubchenko dated 7 
April 1943. He notes that the majority of Ukrainian policemen in Galicia were people with 
middle and higher levels of education. Many engineers, teachers and scientists had entered the 
police, raising the general level of the auxiliary police.  
„In addition, one sees in it [the police] here the new seed of the Ukrainian army. 
They hate Poles, and the yellow and blue badge with its trident is a knife in the 
heart of every Pole.‟84 
The Polish underground recognised the fact that Ukrainian society was not monolithic. 
However, only the OUN appears as an actor, terrorising the Ukrainian population, enforcing 
unconditional support and using the Germans to liquidate the Poles. The Ukrainian youth was 
primed to fight the Poles „even if this battle should be lost‟. However, the Home Army was 
aware that the Bandera faction of the OUN also fought against the Germans and reported 
waves of arrests among Ukrainians.
85
 
At the beginning of 1943 hope germinated on the Polish side that a rapprochement might be 
possible. Talks were held between the OUN-B and the Home Army. The fear of a return of 
the Bolsheviks softened the behaviour of Ukrainians towards Poles. However, this 
rapprochement was only of short duration. The talks clearly showed that the positions were 
incompatible. Neither side was ready to renounce their claim to Lviv. Polish and Ukrainian 
underground organisations alike expected a new Polish-Ukrainian war similar to the battle for 
East Galicia and Lviv in 1918/19.
86
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After the defeat of Stalingrad the Nazi occupiers changed their strategy and attempted to win 
over Poles, and more especially Ukrainians, with the hope of inducing them to contribute 
more actively to the war against the Soviet Union. In 1943 the Ukrainian SS division „Galicia‟ 
was formed, and tens of thousands Ukrainians volunteered to fight against the Soviet Army. 
While the leaders of the OUN-B and the UPA initially warned against joining the SS division, 
they later changed their position. The SS would provide Ukrainians with weapons and 
military training. Both could become important in a future fight for an independent Ukrainian 
state, not least against Polish military organisations in East Galicia and Volhynia.
87
 
In spring 1943 Ukrainian nationalist partisans in Volhynia began attacking Polish villages and 
massacring the inhabitants. Their aim was to expel all Poles from these territories which were 
claimed for an independent Ukrainian state. Soon the first refugees began arriving and the 
Volhynian murders became the talk of all Polish homes. In July 1943 the wave of murderous 
attacks reached East Galicia. The local Command of the Home Army stated that „our 
Ukrainians‟ assumed that this was their biggest opportunity yet to drive away all Poles. While 
the Germans were considered the main enemy, followed by the „Bolsheviks‟, the „next and 
the most terrible‟ enemy was „the Ukrainian‟.88 
The Ukrainian writer Arkadii Liubchenko wrote in his diary that ‘now one also begins to 
destroy Poles here’. He shows a certain sympathy for the Poles, who had already suffered 
much under Soviet and German occupation and from the Ukrainian insurgents in Volhynia. 
Liubchenko noted that the Poles trembled with fear and the Ukrainians hated them with an 
exceptional hatred, which was returned by the Poles.  
„The aggravation of the relations between Ukrainians and Poles increases. The 
individual murders of each group by the other are escalating. There is much 
consternation in both groups.‟89 
The Polish society was „lethally tired‟. Their physical and psychological strength was 
dwindling, and nerves were stretched to breaking point. Poles overheard Ukrainian policemen 
greeting each other in the summer of 1943 with the slogan „death to the Lachi [Poles] – 
death‟. Similar slogans appeared on many trains and on many walls. In June 1943 one slogan 
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on the walls of the Lviv ghetto read: „The ghetto for Poles‟. The Poles – according to a report 
by the Polish underground – all thought the Ukrainians should be punished for their crimes.90  
The OUN-B accused the Home Army of attacking Ukrainian villages. It did not connect this 
to the murders carried out by Ukrainian combat units in Polish villages. Most Poles counted 
on a quick English victory and were prepared for a revolt „against us, the autochthonous 
population of Western Ukraine‟. In November 1943 the OUN reported that everywhere Poles 
were increasing their activities and stepping up the armed struggle against Ukrainians.
91
 The 
OUN observed that as the situation of the war changed, the self-confidence of the Polish 
population grew. This led to patriotic proclamations in public (on the streets, in the trams and 
in the markets). On 1 November 1943 Poles decorated the graves in the military cemetery for 
the 1918/19 „Defenders of Lwów‟ with Polish flags and lit candles. On the 25th anniversary 
of the battle for Lviv pamphlets appeared, bearing titles such as „Leopolis - semper fidelis‟, 
calling for a „free Poland with a Polish Lwów‟. The Poles felt themselves to be so strong that 
they even carried out a compulsory collection of monies for the „battle against the Germans‟ 
in a cinema. The Ukrainian population was shaken by the strength of the Home Army. 
Several prominent Ukrainian professors were assassinated, and their deaths were followed by 
attacks on both Ukrainian auxiliary policemen and German targets.
92
 But this did not deter the 
Ukrainian auxiliary police from continuing to murder Poles.
93
 
While the Home Army was strong in Lviv and in some towns, the situation of the Polish 
population in the villages was desperate. Open war raged between Poles and Ukrainian 
nationalist partisans who were attempting to cleanse the eastern areas of Poles.
94
 The OUN 
reported that Ukrainian retaliatory actions filled the Poles with fear, so much so that they fled 
even from safe areas to the big cities or to central Poland; moreover the OUN accused Poles 
of terrorising the Ukrainian population and of using the Germans but also Soviet partisans and 
the NKVD to settle their score with the Ukrainians. The OUN talked of a „Polish-Ukrainian 
front‟. At night armed Polish commandos patrolled the streets in Lviv and shot at least eleven 
auxiliary policemen. In several incidents, Polish units left the city in retaliation for UPA 
                                                 
90
 Report no. 5, 22 May 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 28-34; Report no. 6, 29 June 1943, ibid., 35-37; 
Report no. 7, 23 June 1943, ibid., 38-44; Report no. 4 on the situation in Lviv, 9 March 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 
203 (MF 2400/3), 136-137. 
91
 Report by the OUN from Lviv, 15 September – 15 October 1943, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 5-8; 
Report by the OUN from Lviv, 15 October – 15 November 1943, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 26, ark. 9-10. 
From a note of the „Kruk‟ unit, summer 1943, cited in Grzegorz Motyka, „Lachów usunąć! Wolyń i Galicja 
Wschodnia 1943-44‟, in Gazeta Wyborcza, 13. April 2002. 
92
 Report by the OUN on the situation in Lviv, November 1943, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 29-36. 
93
 Report for 1 March – 15 March 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/3), 114-126; Report for 15 March – 15 
April 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/3), 97-100; Report for 15 May – 31 May 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 
(MF 2400/4), 185-190. On the killing of Poles during passport controls see Grzegorz Motyka, Tak było w 
Bieszczadach. Walki polsko-ukrainskie 1943-1948 (Warsaw 1999), 127. 
94
 Commentary to a report on the Ukrainian question, not dated (January/February 1944), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 
(MF 2400/8), 63-64; Report on the political and military situation in Eastern Little Poland, not dated (probably 
January 1944), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 43-53; Draft of an operational plan, 10 October 1944, AAN, 
AK-KOL, 203 (MF2400/4), 22-27. 
actions against Polish villages and killed about 130 Ukrainians.
95
 Liubchenko noted that the 
Poles had a „scornful expression on their faces‟ as they waited for the Bolsheviks.96  
By this time the retaliatory acts of the Home Army were making the auxiliary police more 
cautious, and by April 1944 desertions among Ukrainian auxiliary policemen were increasing. 
In July the attacks on Polish villages also began to die down. The Polish population took heart 
again from the landing of the Allied Forces in Normandy.
97
 The OUN noted how the Poles on 
the street were full of self-confident triumph.
98
 
The approach of the Red Army unnerved the Ukrainian population. The intelligentsia reacted 
panic-stricken, and by February, many were already trying to flee to the West with their 
families. The OUN accused the intelligentsia of having forgotten their patriotic duty and their 
responsibility for the national destiny. In the spring of 1944 the Ukrainian intelligentsia had 
completely lost hope and lacked – according to the OUN – a positive sense of the struggle. 
Dantesque scenes were described as taking place at the railway station shortly before the 
return of the Red Army. The OUN, for its part, placed its hopes in those who awaited „the 
new evil‟ with dignity and with calm.99  
The majority of the Polish population was inclined to support a radical solution for the 
Ukrainian question. The average Pole – as the Polish underground had already noted at the 
end of 1941 – was in favour of deporting all Ukrainians over the river Zbrucz to Soviet 
Ukraine. Any thoughts on a possible reconciliation were, at best, voiced by only a few 
members of the elites of both groups, but as soon as the question touched on possible borders 
between a Ukrainian and a Polish state, all talks ceased.
100
 In their memoranda on the 
„solution of the Ukrainian question‟ the staff of the Home Army of Lviv mirrored the mood of 
the population. In July 1942 it recommended deporting between one and one and a half 
million Ukrainians to the Soviet Union and settling the remainder in other parts of Poland. In 
the eastern areas of Poland not more than 10% of the population should consist of national 
minorities. Any suggestions regarding a limited autonomy for Ukrainians, as were being 
discussed in Warsaw and London, would find no support among the local population.
101
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The attacks of Ukrainian partisans on Polish villages in Volhynia increased the Polish 
determination to remove the Ukrainian population living in the eastern Polish areas by 
resettling them. After the war – as one author stated in a memorandum – the conditions would 
be ideal because the Ukrainians could expect to be punished for their criminal behaviour. One 
report recommended expropriating the Ukrainian peasants and resettling them. Such a 
resettlement would guarantee a Polish majority in the Kresy. The battle against the Ukrainians 
and the Soviets was seen as in the tradition of a „centuries old battle to ensure that these areas 
belonged to Europe.‟102 The authors still firmly believed in the civilising mission of Poles in 
the east – „our historic mission is to carry religion and culture to the East‟ – with the 
Ukrainians considered as belonging to the East.
103
 The education of the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia at Western universities had changed this perception as little as had their Roman 
Catholic affiliation, since Ukrainians were held to possess an „eastern, Byzantine 
mentality‟.104  
But all such mooted plans came to nothing. Poles and Ukrainians underestimated the strength 
of the Soviet Army and overestimated the willingness of Britain and the United States to 
confront the Soviet Union over the question of the Eastern borders of Poland. On 9 September 
1944, the government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the communist Polish 
proto-government agreed in Lublin on a large scale population exchange between the Soviet 
Union and Poland. All Poles, including the Lviv Poles, had to leave the territory of the 
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. Lviv became a Soviet city with a predominantly 
Ukrainian population. 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
The analysis of contemporary sources has shown that the incompatible recollections of Poles, 
Jews and Ukrainians can be explained with their incompatible experiences (Erfahrungen). 
The Soviet occupation policy in Eastern Poland was based, first of all, on Realpolitik or class 
politics and only in the second instance on ethno-political categories. However, the 
impressions of the local populations were structured by their respective ethnic patterns of 
perception. Soviet measures were reinterpreted accordingly. When the Soviet power 
implemented its class conflict policies against the pre-war elites, this affected all ethnic 
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groups; however, because of their dominant position before the war it affected the Poles most, 
followed by the Jews. Survival strategies which were accepted and understood as such when 
employed by members of their own group were used to reproach the „other‟ group if they 
employed them and were categorised using traditional ethnic patterns of interpretation. Only 
behaviour which strengthened and confirmed ethnic stereotypes was taken in. Contradictory 
information was noted, but did not flow into the process of interpretation. Before the NKVD 
murders in the prisons in June 1941, many Poles and Ukrainians were already collectively 
blaming the Jews for Soviet actions. After the German invasion and in the absence of the real 
culprits – the NKVD – the Polish and Ukrainian populations reverted to their traditional 
scapegoating of the Jews. Traditional local anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic stereotypes, 
German anti-Semitic propaganda, grievances for injuries suffered under the Soviet occupation 
and terrible hatred came together. The first pogroms followed the pattern of pogroms during 
the First World War and earlier. But this time there was a big difference. The Austrian and 
Polish authorities had tried to prevent pogroms, and, despite their strong anti-Semitic 
sentiments, even the Russian military authorities in 1914/15 did not incite the local population 
to commit pogroms. The new Nazi-German authorities not only did not lift a hand to prevent 
the pogroms but actually encouraged them. To win over the local population and make them 
accomplices in the mass murder of Jews was part of their programme of annihilation.
105
 
It is unclear what role the German propaganda played in this interpretative process which did 
everything to encourage anti-Semitism among Ukrainians and Poles and massively 
propagated the identification of Jews with Bolshevism, minting the slogan of „Jewish 
Bolshevism‟. The German propaganda used the old stereotype of Judeo-Communism to link 
anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism. It made use of anti-Semitism in its war against the Soviet 
Union and utilised anti-Bolshevism to destroy the Jews.  
There was no shared feeling of common suffering. After the war all groups perceived 
themselves as the principal victim.
106
 The Poles thought they had suffered most, not least 
from Ukrainian attacks. The Ukrainians thought they had endured most, first from the Poles, 
then from the Soviets, whom they bracketed with the Jews, later from the Germans. But in the 
end Poles, Ukrainians and Jews formed different categories of victims. The Jews were not 
only the victims of an unexampled programme of murder by the state, but also victims of their 
Polish and Ukrainian neighbours. In Jewish analyses of Polish and Ukrainian behaviour it was 
not merely a question of passivity, of reproaching Poles and Ukrainians for having stood aside 
and let the Holocaust happen, but of accusing them of having actively participated, first in the 
pogroms at the beginning, then – with particular reference to the Ukrainian auxiliary police – 
as active agents in the murder of Jews. The auxiliary police had connections to the OUN and 
the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which was thereby also implicated as jointly responsible. 
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Moreover many Jews who were able to escape to the forests were subsequently killed by 
Ukrainian partisans. 
The German occupiers had given a terrible example of how to get rid of a whole ethnic group. 
They created the frame within which the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was played out. But it was 
less exterminatory racism than an ideology of integral nationalism which, until the spring of 
1944, determined the anti-Polish actions of the UPA. One can say that the mass murder of 
Polish villagers by Ukrainian partisans attempting to force all Poles to leave Volhynia and 
East Galicia drew its inspiration from the cynical and murderous German population policies. 
But they were not identical. The same applies to the Polish underground. Particularly in Lviv, 
the „Polish-Ukrainian front line‟, the Polish population and parts of the leadership of the 
Home Army were unable to imagine that it would be possible to live side by side with 
Ukrainians after the war and favoured the whole scale ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians from 
East Galicia. 
The Polish experience was shaped by the devastating attacks of Ukrainian partisans on Polish 
villages and finally by the loss of their homeland. The West Ukrainian experience was closely 
linked to the fight against the Poles for East Galicia, the ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians in 
Poland, the failure to build a nation in the post-war period, the terrible Soviet repression after 
1944, and the bloody and exhausting guerrilla war against sovietisation. In Ukrainian-Polish 
relations crimes stand against crimes. The task here is for each side to accept the suffering of 
the „other‟ side and condemn the crimes committed by its „own‟ side.  
This is difficult enough in itself but in connection with the Jews we have an asymmetric 
relationship. Firstly, there are virtually no Galician Jews left in Western Ukraine or in Poland. 
Secondly, it is difficult to accept that the dimension of victimhood is extremely unequal. This 
was already a problem during the war. Neither the Poles nor the Ukrainians were able to come 
to terms with the unique aspect of Jewish suffering. They categorised the annihilation of the 
Jewish community in East Galicia, using stereotypes inherited from a very different past. 
Traumatised by their own experiences of suffering, they were unable to adapt the old 
categories which they used to interpret Jewish behaviour to the new circumstances. Up until 
1942 there were still persons who believed that, in the last instance, the Jews would profit 
from the war. Linking the Jews to the Soviet regime and Soviet crimes was one way of 
exculpating the members of one‟s own group from their participation in pogroms and mass 
murders. In the last two years of the war the Jewish question disappeared from the agenda of 
the OUN and the Home Army. Only a few Jews remained, and they played no role in the 
Polish and Ukrainian plans for the post-war period. The Jews were marginal in Polish and 
Ukrainian perceptions of the war and stayed marginal for over forty years. 
 
 
